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FULL FAITH AND CREDIT-A SUGGESTED APPROACH
TO THE PROBLEM OF RECOGNITION OF
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
HAROLD WRIGHT HOLT i
I. INTRODUCTION

A corporation formed under a general statute of state X seeks to
conduct in state Y an intrastate business' of a kind which Y permits
corporations to carry on if created under its own general corporation
statute. By this statute requiring corporations wishing to carry on
intrastate business of that kind to be associations of its own creation, Y
has "excluded" foreign corporations. 2 Our inquiry is: Can Y so secure
a monopoly of local business 3 to its own corporations?
Even when no claim to immunity from unlimited personal liability
is involved, Y might perhaps reserve the use or exploitation of certain
of its natural resources to its own citizens,--e. g., the privilege of
planting oysters in its tidal waters. 4 Perhaps it could reserve to its
own citizens even the privilege of disposing in trade of the oysters
there raised. However, apart from a few exceptional cases a state may
not under the privileges and immunities clause exclude citizens of other
states from doing within its borders a local business of a kind which
it permits its own citizens to do. 5 Nor can it exclude citizens of other
states from doing through the agency of other human beings local business of a kind which it permits or would permit its own citizens to do
through the same persons as agents.6
When, however, the benefit of limited liability is desired, Y has
decreed that it is available only by virtue of the local corporation laws.
Although Y holds that the use of the corporate form of organization
is dictated by the needs of modern commercial enterprise and permits
an indefinite number of domestic corporations to carry on this particuI A. B., 1917, Dartmouth College; LL. B., 1920, S. J. D., 1928, Harvard University; member of Illinois and American Bars; Professor of Law at University of Illinois; author of RESTATMENT, CONTRACTS, ILL. ANNOT. (1936) ; contributor to various
legal periodicals.
i. I. e., "intrastate" in that no tax or regulation imposed by Y upon the corporation because of its carrying on of the business would violate the commerce clause.
2. Unless otherwise stated a "foreign corporation" is a corporation created under
the laws of a state of the United States other than the one whose statute is challenged
as to constitutionality.
3. "Local business" is a synonym for "intrastate business".
4. McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391 (1877).
5. See Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36, IOI (U. S. 1873) ; Ward v. Maryland,
12 Wall. 418, 430 (U. S. 1870).
6. See Flexner v. Farson, 248 U. S. 289 (1918).
(453)
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lar type of local business, 7 its liberal policy does not extend to corporations formed under the laws of another state.
Nor does the privileges and immunities clause of the Constitution
require any different policy with respect to foreign corporations. One
could forcibly argue that that clause should not be wholly inapplicable
to corporations-that with certain exceptions and subject to certain
limitations a corporation created under the statute of X could claim
the protection of that clause as against the claim of Y of a power to
exclude it from carrying on a local business in Y.8 If all the American
commonwealths pursued in regard to foreign corporations the policy
herein ascribed to Y, many trading and manufacturing businesses now
carried on in several states by one corporation would have to be conducted at greater expense and with less efficiency by several corporations. But however plausible the argument may be for extending the
benefit of the privileges and immunities clause to corporations, such an
argument is of little avail in the light of what the Court has repeatedly
said. Over seventy years ago one member spoke as follows:
"If the right asserted of the foreign corporation, when composed
of citizens of one State, to transact business in other States were
even restricted to such business as corporations of those States
were authorized to transact, it would still follow that those States
would be unable to limit the number of corporations doing business
therein. They could not charter a company for any purpose, however restricted, without at once opening the door to a flood of
corporations from other States to engage in the same pursuits.
They could not repel an intruding corporation, except on the condition of refusing incorporationfor a similar purpose to their own
citizens; and yet it might be of the highest public interest that the
number of corporations in the State should be limited; that they
should be required to give publicity to their transactions; to submit
their affairs to proper examination; to be subject to forfeiture of
their corporate rights in case of mismanagement, and that their
officers should be held to a strict accountability for the manner in
which the business of the corporations is managed, and be liable
to summary removal." 9
Implicit in this language is a feeling that public interest may require
a state to restrict to a definite number of corporations the privilege of
doing a kind of intrastate business with limited liability under the
7. Y's grant of a corporate charter is not "a bestowal of gracious favor by an act
of high prerogative", Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority by the
Taxing Powers of the States (1919) 32 HARV. L. REv. 634, 653.
8. See Henderson, The Position of Foreign Corporations ii Ameican Constitutional Law in 2 HARVARD SrTmIES IN JURISPRUDENCE (1918) 178 et seq.
9. Mr. Justice Field in Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 182 (U. S. I869) (Italics
added). See also dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black in Connecticut General Life
Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U. S. 77, 83 (1938). Cf. Ins. Co. v. Morse, 2o Wall. 445, 456
(U. S. 1874).
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corporate form of organization. It may serve the public interest of a
state to limit the corporations that can carry on intrastate business of
a particular kind to such as secure a permit from some administrative
board. A state may, moreover, allow only domestic corporations to
secure such permission. It is no violation of the Constitution, therefore, for a state to limit the privilege of carrying on an intrastate express
business under the corporate form of organization to domestic corporations.1 0 A state may refuse to allow a foreign corporation to engage
in an intrastate business of a kind not permitted a domestic corporaAnd a foreign corporation has no constitutional privilege of
tion."
conducting an intrastate business that is illegal, even if within the state
of incorporation business of that kind is legal. 12 The public interest
that is served by forbidding a domestic corporation to conduct a certain
type of local business justifies extension of the prohibition to foreign
corporations. The protection of the peculiar public interests that make
some businesses subject to a special type of regulation-the so-called
public utilities-may also reasonably justify the limitation of the privilege of conducting local business of such kinds to domestic corporations.
But it does not follow that under the Constitution a state may allow any
number of domestic corporations to engage in an intrastate business of
a particular kind and exclude all foreign corporations from doing that
kind of local business.
At present it is not difficult to get the privilege of carrying on
most manufacturing or trading businesses under the protection of a
corporate charter. The privilege of incorporation under a liberal type
of statute 1 may be open not only to citizens and residents of the state,
but to non-residents as well. Nor is there a limit to the number of
corporations that may be formed. Quite the contrary-the greater the
number, the greater the revenue obtained from fees. If a state tolerates
the carrying on of a large variety of trading and manufacturing enterprises within its borders by an indefinite number of domestic corporations, can it claim that any interest of its own requires the exclusion
of foreign corporations from all such enterprises? It is difficult to
believe that any such interest exists. Any foreign corporation permitted to engage in intrastate business will be subject to the jurisdiction
of the state courts in all actions brought on causes arising from the
conduct of such business. 14 Such foreign corporation can also be
compelled to file information each year as to its financial condition. 15
io. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 282 U. S. 440 (931).
II. Crescent Cotton Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 257 U. S. 129 (1921).
12. See Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 321, 357 (193o).
13. E. g., ILL. REv. STAT. (1939) c. 32, § 157.1 et seq.
i4. See Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8 (907),
Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U. S. 115, 130-132 (1915).

15. E. g., ILL. Ray. STAT. (1939) c. 32, §§ 157.115, 157.116.
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For false statements in a certificate or other statement of information
the persons responsible can be held liable civilly 16 or criminally. 1 7 The
courts of the state upon application of the proper parties could prevent
a mismanagement of the intrastate business of the corporation.' 8 The
foreign corporation can be required to contribute in taxes or fees
toward the maintenance of the state government. 19 In short the fears
of Mr. Justice Field in Paul v. Virginia 20 as to the evils of extending
to foreign corporations the same or similar liberal privileges in the
carrying on of intrastate business as are extended to domestic corporations seem groundless.
The theory of the power of a state to "exclude" a foreign corporation from participation in intrastate business owes a large part of its
development to statements of Chief Justice Taney in Bank of Augusta
v. Earle 21 who spoke in language that is an odd medley of thought as
to the nature of a corporation and as to the possibility of effective corporate action outside the state of incorporation. At the time he spoke
freedom of incorporation was not yet widespread. Taney had come to
maturity while the use in this country of the corporate form of business
enterprise was for the most part limited to turnpike and canal companies, with activities confined to well-defined territories,-corporations
of a kind now roughly described as "public utilities". Corporations
had rarely been formed to engage in manufacturing or the sale of goods
or services. 2 2
Traces of Taney's anthropomorphism still survive,
23
albeit in more subtle form.
Consider what actually happens. Certain documents are filed in
state X and certain fees paid. An official delivers a certificate which
says that A, B and C with others may engage in certain activities for a
profit-making purpose with their liability limited to their contributions
to capital. The documents are filed, the fees paid and the certificate
granted pursuant to a statute of X. The corporation is thus formed by
virtue of a statute. The members of the corporation (the shareholders)
secure the privilege of profiting from the conduct of a business enterprise at the risk of only a limited liability because the statute of X so
enacts. Certainly the members of the corporation so long as it engages
in business in X in a lawful manner and in compliance with the cor16.

2 MASS. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 181, §§ 14, 17.
17. Id., c. 155, §§ 48, 49.
I8. E. g. by receivership proceedings; see Williamson v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe
Line Co., 56 F. (2d) 503 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1934) §§ 525-527; Kearns, Interstate Receivership Practice (1934) 28 ILL. L. REV.
752. Cf. Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U. S. 123 (1932).
19. See discussion under Part I.
2o. 8 Wall. 168, 182 (U. S. 1868).
21. 13 Pet. 519, 588 (U. S. 1839).
22.

Williston, The History of the Law of Business Corporations Before I8oO, 3

SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (1909) 195, 234-235.
23. E. g. Atlantic Refining Co. v. Virginia, 302 U. S. 22, 26 (937).
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poration statutes of the state will have the benefit of the limited liability
conferred by the statute. Now, to what extent does the full faith and
credit clause require the courts of Y to limit the liability of members
of that corporation in the manner directed by the statute of X?
There is no need to stress that incorporation of the ordinary type
of commercial enterprise has ceased to be a matter of special legislative
grant and has come to be a privilege obtainable on compliance with
some general statute. Nor is it necessary to state the development of
•rules, principles and concepts relative to the legal relations of a foreign
corporation. In the development of that jurisprudence the interstate
commerce clause and the Fourteenth Amendment have had dominant
roles. The privileges and immunities clause has availed foreign corporations nothing. Little attention has been paid to the full faith and
credit clause. But in view of recent decisions which show that that
provision is not wholly inapplicable to the statutes of a sister state,
even though Congress fails to provide what effect shall be given to
authenticated public acts, 24 and because incorporation of the ordinary
trading or manufacturing business is now under a general statute,
rather than by special act, may it not be that a new approach should be
taken to some of the problems concerned with recognition of foreign
corporations? May it not be that a state has to allow a foreign corporation to do a local business within its borders unless it shows some
interest in "exclusion"? May it not be that it is a denial of full faith
and credit to the statute of a sister state to allow only domestic corporations to carry on a local business?
II.

TAXATION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS

One important group of cases involving the theory of the power
of a state to "exclude" a foreign corporation from a local business
consists of those challenging the constitutionality of state taxation. To
be sure, even if a state has under the Constitution absolute power to
prevent a foreign corporation from doing a local business within its
territory, it does not necessarily follow that the state may exact any
fee it chooses in return for the grant to such corporation of the privilege
of engaging in such business. Power to exclude would not necessarily
give the state power to condition its grant of the privilege in any way
it saw fit. 25 Yet in Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York it was said:
24. See Notes (1935) 35 COL. L. REV. 751; (1937) 37 COL. L. REV. 485; (1937) 50
HARv. L. Ra,. 520; (1935) 45 YALE, L. J. 339.
25. See discussion of "unconstitutional conditions" in Henderson, note 8 suipra at
c. viii; Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and ConstitutionalRights (935) 35 COL. L.
REv. 321; Merrill, Unconstitutional Conditions (I929) 77 U. OF PA. L. REV. 879;
Sharp, Movenent in Supreme Court Adjudication-A Study of Modified and Overruled Decisions (1933) 46 HARv. L. REV. 593, 629-630. Illustrative of a former trend
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"Having the absolute power of excluding the foreign corporation
the State may, of course, impose such conditions upon permitting
the corporation to do business within its limits as it may judge
expedient; and it may make the grant or privilege dependent upon
the.payment of a specific license tax, or a sum proportioned to the
amount of its capital. No individual member of the corporation,
or the corporation itself, can call in question the validity of any
exaction which the State may require for the grant of its privileges." 26
In that case objections to a tax levied by New York upon a
mining corporation of Utah were based on the grounds that the tax
statute violated principles of equality and uniformity and denied equal
protection of the laws. The objections were disposed of by the
assertion:
"It does not lie in any foreign corporation to complain that it is
subjected to the same law with the domestic corporation." 2T
This equality of treatment of foreign and domestic corporations is
important. The tax levied upon the corporation was neither more nor
less than that which New York would have levied upon a domestic
corporation doing the same kind and amount of business and possessing
the same kind and amount of property with the same location.
It may well be that later decisions overrule the Horn Silver Mining
Co. case insofar as it stands for the proposition that the Constitution
allows a state to exact of a foreign corporation any fee or tax it sees fit
to impose as a return for permitting such corporation to engage in a
local business within the state. 28 But the case still has importance in
that it did not hold that New York by means of its taxing power could
exclude foreign corporations from the field of intrastate business and
allow only corporations of its own creation to graze therein.
Once a foreign corporation has qualified under the statutes of Y
for the transaction of intrastate business therein, is the corporation
entitied to the benefit of the equal-protection-of-the-laws clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment so far as state taxation in Y is concerned?
E. g., a corporation incorporated in X qualifies to engage in intrastate
business in Y. After it has commenced to carry on such a business, Y
contrary to the position stated by the writer see Allen v. Pullman's Palace Car Co.,
191 U. S. 171 (1903); Pullman Co. v. Adams, 189 U. S. 42o (1903).
Cf. Maine v.
Grand Trunk Ry., 142 U. S. 217 (i8gi) and explanation thereof in Galveston, H. & S.
A. Ry. v. Texas, 210 U: S. 217 (9o8).
26. Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 143 U. S. 305, 315 (1892) (Italics
added).
27.

Ibid.

28. See Henderson, note 8 supra at c. vi; Powell, note 7 supra at 613 and 759,
and (1919) 32 HARv. L. REv. 634 at 649-650; but cf. Note (1940) 53 HARv. L. REv.
672.
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passes a statute imposing upon this foreign corporation a tax to which
domestic corporations engaged in similar business within the state are
not subject. The tax burdens of foreign corporations doing intrastate
business in state Y are increased, but those of domestic corporations
carrying on the same kind of business are not. Would such legislation
violate the equal-protection-of-the4aws clause?
Southern Ry. v. Greene,29 supplemented by Hanover Fire Insurance Co. v. Harding30 shows that in some cases it would. And these
cases have considerable significance upon our problem. Suppose our
hypothetical corporation were to be admitted to do an intrastate business
in Y before that state passed a statute that the only corporations it
would thereafter permit to carry on that kind of local business in Y
would be those of its own creation. As applied to our corporation such
a statute would seem to violate the equal-protection-of-the-laws clause.
True, the investors in that corporation (the stockholders) might cause
a domestic corporation to be formed under the laws of Y to take over
the business. So a domestic (Alabama) corporation could have been
formed in Southern Ry. v. Greene. Had the Supreme Court handed
down a contrary decision, the probability is that an Alabama corporation would have been organized to take over and operate the properties
in that state of the Southern Railway Company.3 1 So also an Illinois
corporation could have been formed, had a contrary decision been
rendered in Hanover Fire Insurance Co. v. Harding, to take over the
business in Illinois of the Hanover Fire Insurance Company, with its
stock owned or controlled by that company. But the possibility of
organizing a subsidiary domestic corporation in the taxing state is not
an effective answer to the contentions of the complainant foreign corporations in those cases. Those decisions rest on the extension of the
equal-protection-of-the-laws clause to a foreign corporation doing a
local business in the state.
In Southern Ry. v. Greene the corporation was engaged in both
interstate and intrastate transportation, and there was some indication
that the doctrine of that case was to be limited to public service or
utility corporations.3 2 In fact the court did state that its decision was
in a large part dictated by the holding in Western Union Telegraph Co.
v. Kansas3 3 in which the carrying on in Kansas by a foreign corporation of the business of both interstate and intrastate transmission of
information was an important factor. However, a foreign corporation
doing only an intrastate business is likewise entitled to equal protection
29.

216 U. S. 400 (I9IO).

30. 272 U. S. 494 (1926).
31. See Henderson, note 8 smpra at 153-154.

32. White Co. v. Commonwealth, 218 Mass. 558, 579-580, io6 N. E. 310, 319
(1914), cert. granted, 246 U. S. 147, 156 (ii8).
33. 216 U. S. i (igio).
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of the laws. 34

Nor is the fact that the Southern Railway Company

was engaged in transportation to be stressed. 35 In HanoverFire Insurance Co. v. Harding a foreign corporation was carrying on an insurance business and no interstate commerce was involved. 36 The case
indicates that the doctrine of the Greene case is not limited to foreign
corporations that have acquired "permanent and valuable" property
within the taxing state nor to public utility corporations engaged in
transportation. Seemingly any foreign corporation that (i) has once
lawfully secured permission to do business in a state, (2) has pursuant
thereto done business therein and (3) has built up an expectancy of
continued business therein ("goodwill") is entitled to the benefit of the
equal-protection-of-the-laws clause as applied in Southern Ry. v. Greene.
If any permanent investment is needed, the presence of "large numbers
of records" concerning the business will suffice. Under present day
business methods no corporation need fear that it will be unable to satisfy this requirement! Perhaps it is essential that the business be
"large and profitable". Whether it is or not, one thing is certain-if
the business is not "profitable", the foreign corporation will eventually
come to consider its constitutional privileges as of only academic interest.
There still remains the problem suggested by, but not directly presented in, Hanover Fire Insurance Co. v. Harding: Could Y make a
promise of future compliance with the tax statute a condition precedent
to renewal of the license? The recent case of Atlantic Refining Co. v.
Virginia 37 has some bearing.
The Atlantic Refining Company, a Pennsylvania corporation, had
before 1930 transacted interstate commerce in Virginia. In that year
it applied to the Virginia Corporation Commission for a certificate of
authority to engage in intrastate business. It had never previously done
any local business in the state, but had had its product marketed locally
through two other duly qualified foreign corporations. The Atlantic
Refining Company had never had any property or place of business in
Virginia. The certificate was granted, but according to statute payment
of $50o0 as a fee was exacted. The corporation paid under protest,
sued for a refund and failed to recover. The highest state court
affirmed the denial and its judgment was affirmed by the Supreme
Court of the United States.
34. Power Manufacturing Co. v. Saunders, 274 U. S. 490 (1927).
Even if the
foreign corporation is not authorized to do business within the state, the equal-protection-of-the-laws clause prevents the state from arbitrarily discriminating against it
when it seeks to sue to recover tangible property taken into the state without its knowledge or consent: Kentucky Finance Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exchange Corp., 262

U. S. 544 (1923).

35. 216 U. S. 400, 412 (91o).
36. See N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U. S. 495 (1913).
37. 302 U. S. 22 (937).
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The Virginia statute

38

fixed the fee for a corporation with an

authorized capital stock of $50,000 or less at $30 and for a corporation

with an authorized capital stock in excess of $90,ooo,ooo at the sum of
$5ooo. For a corporation with an authorized capital between these two
extremes the amount of the fee was determined according to a scale
not graduated in proportion to the amount of authorized capital. At
the time of its application the Atlantic Refining Company had an issued
capital of $67,049,500, an authorized capital of $ioo,ooo,ooo and net
assets in excess of $132,000,000.

The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Brandeis, did not decisively state whether Virginia could have "excluded" the corporation
from intrastate business in that Commonwealth. In regard to doing
such business the statement was made that,
"Whether the privilege shall be granted to a foreign corporation
is a matter of state policy. Virginia might refuse to grant the
privilege for any business, or might grant the privilege for some
kinds of business and deny it to others. It might grant the privilege to all corporations with small capital while denying the privilege to those whose capital or resources are large. It might grant
the privilege without exacting compensation; or it could insist
upon a substantial payment as a means of raising revenue." 39
On that premise-and in accord with the distinction drawn in
Hanover Fire Insurance Co. v. Harding40 between the powers of a
state over entrance fees demanded of foreign corporations for the grant
of authority to transact intrastate business and taxes levied upon foreign
corporations after they have qualified for, and engaged in, the transaction of such business-the court might have held that the measure of
the fee was in the discretion of Virginia and that any inequality as
between foreign corporations and domestic corporations in that regard
did not fall within the prohibitions of the due process clause or of the
equal-protection-of-the-laws clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
However, the Court was willing to consider whether the exaction
of the sum of $5000 violated any constitutional right of the Atlantic
Refining Company. It concluded that
"Even if the Federal Constitution conferred upon every foreign
corporation the right to enter any State and carry on there a local
business upon paying a reasonable fee, there is nothing in the
record to show that the $5,000 charged is more than reasonable
compensation for the privilege granted." 41
38. VA. TAX CODE (Michie, 1936) § 207.
39. 302 U. S. :2, 26 (1937).
40. 272 U. S. 494, 5IO, 511 (1926).
4L 302 U. S. 22, 27 (937).
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The corporation contended that measuring the entrance fee solely by
the authorized capital deprived it of property without due process of
law because the amount was determined by reference to property beyond
the taxing power of Virginia. The Court answered with the statement
that the fee was paid for a privilege granted.
As to the contention that the statute denied equal protection of the
laws it was said:
"Even if a corporation which has not yet been admitted to do
business were in a position to complain that the State denies it
equal protection, there is here no basis for a claim of discrimination.
Every foreign corporation with an authorized capital exceeding
ninety million dollars which seeks admission to do an intrastate
business is, and has been since 191o, required to pay the same

entrance fee."

42

But perhaps the most significance is to be attached to the following:
"Nor is there any discrimination between foreign corporations and
domestic of which the company may complain. While the charter
fees of domestic corporations are smaller than the entrance fees
of foreign corporations, Virginia levies upon foreign corporations,
after admission, less in taxes than it does upon domestic corporations. A domestic corporation with an authorized capital of
$ioo,ooo,ooo is required to pay a charter fee of only $6oo; but
it must pay each year a franchise tax of $8,85o. A foreign corporation of that authorized capital is required to pay an entrance
fee of $5,ooo, but pays no franchise tax whatever." 43
One factor, then, in determining the "reasonableness" of the Virginia fee is the fact that the amount is not out of line with the amount
exacted as fees and taxes of domestic corporations of similar capitalization. No indication is given as to where the line is to be marked
out between "reasonableness" and "arbitrariness"; but one cannot avoid
feeling after a perusal of the opinion that somewhere such a line is to
be drawn.
The writer will refrain from a detailed discussion of tax decisions,
but will content himself with pointing out that the powers of a state in
regard to the exaction of a fee from a foreign corporation for granting
the privilege of doing a local business are not as broad as its powers in
regard to charging a domestic corporation for the same privilege. The
discrimination is not againstthe foreign corporation, but in favor of it.
True, a state may have as broad powers in exaction of a fee or tax for
allowing a foreign corporation to engage only in a purely intrastate
business as it has in regard to charging a domestic corporation for the
Id. at 31.
43. Ibid.
42.
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same privilege. 44 A state may measure the charter fee of a domestic
corporation by a percentage of the total authorized capital stock without
regard to any maximum and may graduate the same in direct proportion to the amount of total authorized capital. 45 The license fee or
tax a state may levy upon a foreign corporation for the privilege of
doing both interstate and intrastate business cannot be so measured. 4 6
Clearly the Atlantic Refining Company was not put into the position of
complying in the future with a revenue statute discriminating against
it in favor of domestic corporations.
The decision does not mean that Virginia could have excluded the
corporation entirely. There are, as has been said, statements that it
could, but these, it is submitted, are not to be taken literally in view of
the assumption to the contrary made by the court for the sake of argument and the pains taken to show that the fee was not unreasonable in
the light of the charges Virginia exacted of similar domestic corporations. As has been pointed out, even if a state does have power to
"exclude" a foreign corporation from a local business, it does not necessarily have power to condition in any way it sees fit its grant of a
license to engage in such business. However, the amount of a fee
charged for granting such privilege would not, in itself, make the exaction of the fee an "unconstitutional condition". The decision does not
warrant any conclusion that the state could give a monopoly of local
business to domestic corporations. In this respect the case is on a par
47
with Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York.
If Virginia had the unrestrained power to "exclude" the foreign
corporation from local business, here was a good case. The company
had no property in the, state. It had done no local business there. It
could have kept on with the subsidiary corporations. However, to hold
that Virginia could exact an entrance fee of any amount it sees fit to
charge would be to open the door to allowing each state in which the
Atlantic Refining Company does business to force the local business of
the company in such state to be handed over to a local domestic corporation, with the consequent inefficiencies and losses already suggested.
The truth is that the theory of the power of a state to "exclude"
a foreign corporation from intrastate business has now little, if any, use
in the determination of the constitutionality of a fee or tax demanded
for granting or continuing the privilege of doing such business. Once
the privilege has been granted, the Fourteenth Amendment prevents
the state from discriminating against the corporation in taxation in
favor of domestic corporations doing the same kind of business. It
44. Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 3o8 U. S. 331 (1939).
45. Kansas City, M. & B. R. R. v. Stiles, 242 U. S. I1 (1916).
46. See Note (1938) 51 HARv. L. REv. 5o8.
47. See p. 457 supra.
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seems probable, furthermore, that a state cannot "exclude" a foreign
corporation from a local business if the corporation is engaged or
proposes to engage in an interstate business which, for efficient and
economical operation, requires the doing in association of a local business of that particular type.48 No reasonable inference can be drawn
from the Atlantic Refining Company case or from Ford Motor Co. v.
Beauchamp 49 that a state can "exclude" a foreign corporation from a
local business which it permits as many domestic corporations to carry
on as there are groups of investors willing to incorporate under its
statute dealing with the formation of business corporations.
But a foreign corporation seeking a permit to do local business
within a state is not yet a "person" within the "jurisdiction" entitled
to "equal protection of. the laws". Any claim by it of constitutional
right to do a local business must rest on some other part of the Constitution.
III.

IMPOSITION OF ADDITIONAL LIABILITIES UPON MEMBERS OF
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS

Through the use of the corporate form of organization investors
in a commercial enterprise may secure the benefit of limited liability.
The assets of the corporation may not suffice for the payment of its
obligations, but ordinarily once a stockholder has paid the full amount
due upon his stock subscription, he is discharged from further liability
to the corporation or its creditors. In certain cases stockholders may
be liable for an additional amount, but seldom do they incur unlimited
liability for corporation debts. Were there not limited liability there
would be slight incentive for contributors of capital to use the corporate
What is the duty of other states
form of business organization."
towards enforcing such limited liability? If they are under a duty to
enforce it, the conclusion can be reasonably drawn that such other states
are compelled to apply the full faith and credit clause to that part of the
incorporation statute of the sister state the operation of which distinguishes the corporate form of business organization from other forms
of commercial associations.
Full faith and credit may also require a state to allow enforcement
in its courts of the liability imposed upon stockholders in a foreign
corporation by a statute of the state of incorporation. Whether the
duty to give such full faith and credit exists depends upon whether the
statute is so drawn that courts in other states can enforce liabilities
48. See Powell, note 7 supra at 6o8.
49. 308 U. S. 331 (1939).
50. WARREN, CORPORATE ADVANTAGES

WITHOUT INCORPORATION (1929)

25-26.
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arising under it.51 And, carrying the question still further, what are
the powers of a state as to the imposition of liabilities upon stockholders
in a foreign corporation which are not imposed by the law of the state
of incorporation?
Suppose Y has a statute that imposes personal and individual liability
upon stockholders of all corporations, domestic and foreign, for obligations of their respective companies wherever incurred. The statute
allows any creditor of aiiy corporation to recover judgment against any
stockholder in the debtor company for such a proportion of the indebtedness as the amount of stock owned at the 'time the obligation is
incurred bears to the total of the subscribed shares. Assume, further,
a case where (i) the plaintiff, a resident of state Mll, is a bona fide
creditor of a corporation formed in X solely to do business in that
state, (2) the plaintiff's claim arises from non-performance of a contract made with the corporation in X under which all performance was
to have taken place there, and (3) defendant, a stockholder, is a resident of Z, but subject to personal service of process in Y. No one
would be a Cassandra who predicted that, if the court of Y held the
statute applicable to the facts just set forth, the Supreme Court would
hold that it violated due process in that its passage was beyond the legislative competence of the state.5 2 Why should Y be allowed to enforce
the statute in the case put? What interests of its own would such
enforcement serve? The parties are neither citizens nor residents of Y.
The corporation has not done business therein. It has incurred no debt
or other obligation in Y.
Still, under some circumstances Y might make a stockholder in a
foreign corporation personally liable for a corporation obligation. By
statute California formerly did impose upon a stockholder of a domestic
corporation or of a foreign corporation doing business in the state
individual and personal liability for such proportion of any of its debts
and liabilities as the amount of stock owned at the time such obligation
5 3
was incurred bore to the whole of the subscribed stock.
In Pinney v. Nelson 54 a California court had held California
citizens and residents as stockholders in a Colorado corporation liable
for their proportionate shares of a debt incurred by the corporation
under contracts made, executed and performable in California. The
51. See Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629 (1935) ; Abbot, Conflict of Laws and
the Enforcement of the Statutory Liability of Stockholders in a Foreign Corporation
(r909) 23 HARV. L. REV. 37; Langmaid, The Full Faith and Credit Required for Public Acts (1929) 24 ILL. L. REV. 383, 393-395.
52. Cf. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Liebing, 259 U. S. 209 (1922) ; N. Y. Life
Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U. S. 357 (1918); N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U S 149
(913)
53. CAL. CONST. 1879, Art. 12, §§ 3, 15 (now repealed) ; CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering,
1886) §322 [repealed by CAL. CiV. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 322].
54. 183 U. S. I44 (I90I).
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articles of incorporation stated that the corporation was created to
carry on part of its business outside of Colorado and that the principal
plant and operations outside of that state should be in California.
Seemingly Colorado law imposed no liability for corporate debts upon
stockholders. The Federal Supreme Court held that enforcement of the
statute of California did not violate the due process clause or the equalprotection-of-the-laws clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Thomas v. Matthiessen 55 a California citizen sued in New
York 5 6 to enforce against a resident of that state, a stockholder in an
Arizona corporation formed to erect and run a hotel in California, the
liability the defendant was alleged to have incurred under the statute
of California for the payment of a part of the amount due upon two
notes given by the corporation in California for money lent. The corporation had qualified to do business in California, had built the hotel
and had become insolvent. Under Arizona law the stockholders were
exempt from personal liability for debts of the corporation.5" Furthermore, at the time the defendant subscribed for his stock he had
made a written agreement with the corporation whereunder the latter
had promised that he should be exempt from personal liability. The
trial court gave judgment for the defendant, the Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed, but on certiorari the Supreme Court reversed.
Neither of these cases upholds the constitutionality of a statute
imposing individual liability upon all stockholders in any corporation
for all obligations of such corporation. In both, the stockholders were
charged with liability for obligations under contracts said to have been
"made" and to have called for performance in California. Ir Thonas
v. Matthiessen the notes were executed and delivered in that state and
presumably the money lent upon them was spent there. In Pinney v.
Nelson the court refused to discuss whether the stockholders could be
charged with liability under the statute for obligations contracted in
the course of business transacted in Colorado. The court refused also
to consider whether the defendant would have been held liable in the
absence of the provision in the charter specifically naming California
as a state in which the corporate business was to be conducted. In the
Thomas case Mr. Justice Holmes questions whether the stockholders
could have been charged had such charter provision been omitted and
in the case then before him he points out that the defendant had signed
a writing reciting the intent of the subscribers to form a corporation
to build and operate a hotel in California. This caution would warrant
the inference that the Court felt that something more than the mere
55. 232 U. S. 22I (1914).
56. See p. 469 infra.
57. Amz. REv. CODE (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 579.
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holding of stock in the debtor corporation was necessary to justify the
imposition of the statutory liability. Mr. Justice Holmes was willing
to admit that its charter may empower a corporation to impose a liability
upon a stockholder. Otherwise, so he felt, one seeking to hold a stockholder upon an obligation alleged to have been imposed by act of the
corporation must show authority from the stockholder to the corporation. He was willing to assume that a corporation has no greater power
in this regard merely because of a provision in the charter authorizing
the doing of business in foreign states, especially if the charter makes
no mention of a possible difference in laws as to stockholder liability. 58
Here, too, one who seeks to hold a stockholder liable upon an obligation
alleged to have been incurred by reason of the transaction of business
by the corporation in a foreign state must show some authority to the
corporation from the stockholder to impose the liability. Without such
authority the statute of the foreign state imposing stockholder liability
is not to be applied. And the grant of such authority cannot be predicated merely upon the fact that the corporation was acting within the
scope of its charter powers in transacting local business within the
foreign state. Something more than the transaction of such business is
needed to subject the stockholder to the jurisdiction of the foreign state
in respect to the imposition of individual liability.
Statements in Leyner Engineering Works v. Kempner 5 9 agree
with Mr. Justice Holmes. In that case the defendant was a stockholder
in a Texas corporation which built a tunnel in Colorado. During such
construction the plaintiff extended credit to the corporation for supplies
and machinery, for which the corporation failed to pay. It had not
qualified to do business in Colorado. Under the Colorado statute 60
this failure made every officer, agent and stockholder jointly and severally personally liable on contracts of the corporation made within
Colorado during the period the corporation was in default. According
to Texas statute 61 no stockholder in a Texas corporation was liable
for its debts beyond the amount unpaid on his stock and no suit was to
be instituted against a stockholder for the recovery of such unpaid
amount until after judgment against the corporation and return of
execution unsatisfied. The plaintiff sued defendant in Texas for the
recovery of the amount due from the corporation, claiming that the
statute of Colorado imposed liability. The defendant contended that
enforcement of the Colorado statute would contravene the equalprotection-of-the-laws clause and the privileges and immunities clause.
58. 232 U. S. 221, 233, 234 (913).
59. 163 Fed. 605 (S. D. Tex. 19o8).
6o. CoLo. GzN. LAWS 1877, Ch. xix, §§ 23-25.
6i. TEx. STAT. (Vernon, 1928) Art. 1395.
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The court held that the defendant's liability as stockholder was to be
determined in accordance with the statute of Texas.
"What law fixes the liability of stockholders; that is, does the
statute law of the state of incorporation fix and determine the
liability of the shareholder, or is the liability to be determined and
the stockholder charged by the enactments of every state in the
Union in which the corporation may transact business? . . . That
the law of the state in which the corporation is created, either in
its constitutional provisions or legislative enactments, alone fixes
and determines the liability of the shareholder, is beyond controversy..
"If the constitution to which a corporator has agreed does not
provide for individual liability to creditors, he cannot be charged
with individual liability anywhere." 62
There is no statement that the stockholder had knowledge of the
corporation's transaction of business in Colorado; nor that he had
knowledge at the time he acquired his stock of any intention to have
the corporation transact business in Colorado.
In Thomas v.
Matthiessen the stockholder not only had knowledge of the intent to
have the corporation build and operate a hotel in California, but in
writing he expressed his desire that the corporation should do so. This
matter of knowledge and expressed desire must be material. In fact,
the Thomas case considers the defendant stockholder's knowledge and
desire as evidence that the defendant had authorized the corporation to
act as his agent in California-to make him a party to a contract made
in California by the corporation with its creditor. However, the
defendant stockholder had not in fact assented to the imposition of
personal liability upon him. Quite the contrary. The existence of a
principal-agent relationship between the defendant stockholder and the
corporation is dubious. To argue that the defendant stockholder was
bound because the corporation had his "authority" to impose a personal
63
liability upon him is to beg the question.
However this may be, why is it necessary to find a principal-agent
relationship in order to justify California in imposing a liability upon
the stockholder in the foreign corporation? In Thomas v. Matthiessen
the stockholder defendant knows and assents to the transaction of
business in that state by the corporation. As a stockholder he may
benefit therefrom. He participates in the formation of a corporation
to carry on a California business. His participation is a link in a chain
of events that leads to the accrual of a claim in California. He becomes
one cause of whatever act agents of the corporation do in its behalf in
62. 163 Fed. 605, 6o8, 61o (S. D. Tex. i9o8).
63. See Note (1931) 44 HARV. L. REv. 615, 617.
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California. He may not be liable under ordinary principles of agency
for what the corporation does in California, but his participation in setting up the corporation is an ". . . element in the chain of those circumstances necessary to the result". 6 4 He becomes an author of harm
suffered in California. Is it distasteful to the ideals of justice for
California to impute liability to the non-resident stockholder ".
.
if
he be in fact the voluntary author of it though the sequence between
his conduct and the damage would be too remote under ordinary principles" ? " In cases of tort liability like Young v. Masci 13 and Scheer v.
Rockne Motors Corp.67 such imputation would be upheld. Why not in
Thomas v. Matthiessen? In torts the principles as to proximate causation that are enforced in cases wholly domestic to the forum are not
necessarily to be enforced in tort cases involving conflict of laws. 68 The
distinction drawn in torts between cases involving conflict of laws and
those that do not suggests that similar distinctions may be drawn in
other fields of the law. Arizona by statute conferred upon the stockholders the privilege of doing business with limited liability not only
within its borders but beyond. California, perhaps, could not have
imposed liability upon stockholders for debts contracted in California
in the course of interstate business. 69 The interest of the United States
in freedom of interstate commerce from local burdens might have overridden any local California interest. Nor could California have imposed
the statutory liability for debts contracted outside of the state, certainly
70
if not contracted incidentally to the course of California business.
Such a statute would seem to be beyond its legislative competence. Nor
could California have provided for personal liability for a debt arising
out of a contract executed in California if that contract had been an
isolated transaction on the part of a foreign corporation not doing a
local business there. 71 Any interest of California in having creditors
paid their claims when incurred in the state would not suffice to outweigh the interest of Arizona in having members of its corporation
immune from personal liability. But any interest of Arizona could
reasonably be held outweighed by the facts that (i) the corporation was
64. Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp., 68 F. (2d) 942, 944 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
65. Ibid.

66.

289 U. S. 253 (1933).

67. 68 F. (2d) 942 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
68. Cheatham, Intenal Law Distinctionsin the Conflict of Laws (1936)

L. Q. 570, 583.

21

CORN.

69. No case under the California statute seems to have involved a corporation engaged in interstate commerce.
70. Would not a statute permitting California to impose liability upon stockholders
of a foreign corporation for debts incurred outside of the state and not contracted as an
incident of business conducted in California be beyond the legislative competence of
California?
71. A question similar to that set forth in the preceding footnote could be pertinently raised here.

470

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

formed to do business in California of a kind peculiarly local to that
state, (2) such business was transacted in the state, (3) in the course
whereof the debt was contracted, very likely to a California citizen and
resident. The defendant may have received no profits, but it is not
unreasonable to hold that the chance of profits from an enterprise so
closely associated with California with the consent of the stockholder
should travel with a liability for debts incurred in the course of that
enterprise.
Suppose that the plaintiff had sued in California instead of New
York. Under Pinney v. Nelson California could have enforced its
statutory liability without violating due process. Suppose that the
plaintiff had sued in Alizona. The Arizona court could properly have
enforced the statutory liability. Of that we can be sure from Thomas v.
Matthiessen. Suppose, however, that the Arizona court had taken the
position that it should give effect to its own statutory declaration that
stockholders in the Arizona corporation should be free from personal
liability for any debt of the corporation. Would there have been an
unconstitutional denial of full faith and credit? In the Thomas case
the matter of full faith and credit seems not to have been raised, but
because of California's numerous "contacts" the conclusion seems
inescapable that the Federal Supreme Court would hold that any public
policy of Arizona would have to yield to California's superior "governmental interest". 72 The Court might well feel that a conflict of laws
question should be converted into one of constitutional law so as to
secure uniformity of decision among all state courts as to the circumstances under which liability could be enforced under the California
73
statute.
Pinney v. Nelson is the weaker case in that the defendant had not
so clearly expressed his desire to have corporate business transacted in
California. However, the corporation was expressly chartered for the
transaction of such business, such business (of a peculiarly local nature)
was transacted in the state and the debt was incurred in the state. California again had significant "contacts". The holding would apply
against any stockholder, not merely an original incorporator and subscriber to the stock.7 4 Perhaps it is material that the defendant was a
75
California resident.
In Leyner Engineering Works v. Kempner, Colorado had no similar "contacts". The debt was incurred in Colorado business, but the
72. The quoted phrase is borrowed from Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial
Accident Commission, 294 U. S. 532 (1935).
73. As to this argument of expediency see Note (1939) 39 COL. L. Ray. 1024.
74. See also Thomas v. Wentworth Hotel Co., I58 Cal. 275, Iio Pac. 942 (igio);
Peck v. Noee, 154 Cal. 351, 97 Pac. 865 (9o8).
75. See Risdon Iron & Locomotive Works v. Furness [19o5] i K. B. 304, 315,
aff'd [i9o6] i K. B. 49.
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corporation had not been incorporated particularly for that business.
Indeed it vas not licensed to do business in Colorado. No evidence
shows that the defendant ever knew that such business was contemplated. The "contacts" between Colorado and the defendant seem insufficient to justify the imposition of liability upon the latter for debts
incurred in the course of the Colorado business. This insufficiency is
brought out when one considers the cases in the next section involving
the problem of stockholder and other individual liability for obligations
of a corporation that transacts business in a state other than that of
incorporation without qualifying under the laws of the foreign state.
At any rate, it seems clear that merely because a state has permitted a foreign corporation to carry on a local business within its
borders the state does not have jurisdiction to impose liability upon
any stockholder, regardless of his citizenship or residence, for debts
of the corporation, whether incurred in the course of that local business
or not. There is one California case, to be sure, that seems to hold that
the state would have jurisdiction to impose liability on any stockholder
for debts of the corporation incurred in the local business in that state. 7 1
However, Thomas v. Matthiessen reveals the necessity for some contacts between the stockholder and California other than the mere transaction of local business in the state to justify the application of the
state constitutional and statutory provisions to a stockholder in a foreign corporation.
IV. LIABILITIES

CONSEQUENT UPON FAILURE OF FOREIGN CORPORA-

TION TO COMPLY WITH STATE STATUTE.

Now we are concerned with cases in which state X has granted a
corporate charter and thereafter in Y officers, directors, agents or
stockholders-some or all-have engaged in commercial activities ostensibly in the name and on behalf of the corporation, but without compliance with statutes in Y passed to regulate those intrastate activities
of foreign corporations which constitute "doing business". Suppose
that A, B and C are directors and officers as well as stockholders. Without observance of the requirements of the statutes of Y they purport
to do business in that state in the name and on behalf of the corporation.
For obligations incurred in Y apparently in the name of the corporation
do they incur personal liability?
In Ryerson & Son v. Shaw 77 an Illinois statute required a foreign
corporation before doing a local business to file certain documents and
76. Provident Gold Mining Co. v. Haynes, 173 Cal. 44, 159 Pac. 155 (1916). Cf.
Boteler v. Conway, 13 Cal. App. (2d) 79, 56 P. (2d) 587 (1936), 23 Cal. App. (2d)
35, 72 P. (2d) 208 (1937).
77. 277 Ill. 524, 1s N. E. 650 (1917).
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to appoint an attorney to receive service of process in Illinois. 78 For
failure to obey the statute a foreign corporation was liable to a fine and
was disqualified from maintaining any action "upon any claim, legal
or equitable, whether arising out of contract or tort in any court in this
State".7 9 A Maine corporation had not qualified under the Illinois
statute, but did business in the state, in the course of which P supplied
goods and services ordered in the name and on behalf of the corporation.
The Supreme Court of Illinois held that officers and directorsmight be
held liable therefor on some theory of warranty of authority, saying
that "a person who assumes to act as agent for a legally incompetent
principal renders himself personally liable to the person with whom he
deals unless such person knows of the want of authority". 80 This reasoning is open to question. The creditor, P, had a right in contract
against the corporation. On what ground, then, could liability be imposed upon the defendants? 1Whatever the answer, clearly liability was not imposed on the
officers and directors as such. A state might have a statute, the court
pointed out, providing that the failure of a foreign corporation to
comply with the requirements for a license to transact a local business
should render all officers, agents and stockholders personally liable on
all contracts of the corporation made within the state during the period
of default. Illinois had no such statute; "such a statute is much broader
than the liability claimed in this case, because it includes stockholders
and others having nothing to do with the particularbusiness or contract
out of which a cause of action arises." 82 P, therefore, could not have
held the stockholders in the Maine corporation to a personal liability in
the absence of an express statute. "Participation" in the transaction
83
out of which the cause of action arose would have had to be shown.
8 4
There are a few cases in accord with Ryerson & Son v. Shaw.
But there are some contra, where the corporation is fined for doing
business without qualifying under the statute, but no personal liability
for obligations of the corporation is imposed on officers and directors
even though they participated in carrying on the business.8 5 Even if
no provision is made for punishing the corporation, and even though
ILL REv. STAT. (Hurd, 1915-16) c. 32, § 67c.
79. Id., § 67g.
8o. 277 Ill. 524, 531, 115 N. E. 653 (1917).
81. In explanation of Ryerson & Son v. Shaw see Critchfield & Co. v. Armour,
See also Brown v. Sprague, 229 Ill. App. 338 (1923);
App. 28, 41 (923).
228 Ill.
but cf. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) § 332, comment b.

78.

(Italics added).
82. 277 Ill. 531, 115 N. E. 653 (917)
83. See The Class Journal v. Harlan, 215 Ill. App. 9 (1919).
84. Lasher v. Stimson, 145 Pa. 30, 23 Atl. 552 (1892), cited in Raff v. Isman, 235
Pa. 347, 351, 84 Atl. 352, 353 (1912).
85. American Soap Co. v. Bogue, 114 Ohio St. i49, I5O N. E. 743 (1926) ; Martin
Bros. v. Nettleton, 138 Wash. 1O2, 244 Pac. 386 (1926).
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it was formed abroad to carry on business in the state with the statutes
of which it failed to comply, no liability has been imposed upon officers,
directors or stockholders for obligations incurred ostensibly in behalf
of the corporation."6 The rights of the plaintiff run only against the
corporation.
Still another type of statute may expressly impose liability upon
officers, agents or stockholders of a foreign corporation for corporate
obligations if it carries on a local business within the state without complying with the statute regulating the admission of foreign corporations.
For example, the Virginia Code required a foreign corporation doing
business in the state to maintain an office therein and to appoint an
agent to receive service of process. By Section 1105 "the officers,
agents and employees of any such company doing business in this State
without complying with the provisions of the preceding section shall be
personally liable to any resident of the State having a claim against
such company. .

.

."

In Richmond Standard Steel Spike & Iron Co.

v. Dininny 87 the legislature was held to have no power to impose
liability for claims against the corporation upon officers, agents and
employees who were citizens and residents of other states and had never
been in the state aiding in carrying on the prohibited business.
"There are good reasons why the controlling officials of a foreign
corporation who cause their company to carry on business in this
State in violation of her laws should be made liable to her citizens
for their claims against the company growing out of such business,
if it could be done, although non-residents of the State; but there
is no reason for making . .

.

liable the subordinate officers and

the agents and employees of the company who did not reside in
the State, and who were in no way responsible for their company's
acts in this State." 88
The court did not discuss who would be "controlling" officers, or
who would be "subordinate". It gave no hint as to whether actual
exercise of a power of control would be necessary for the imposition of
liability upon an officer or whether liability could be predicated upon
the mnere privilege of exercising control. Liability could be imposed
only for a claim incurred to a Virginia resident in the course of the
prohibited business. No further exposition is given as to what would
constitute sufficient "contacts" with Virginia to constitute aiding in the
carrying on of the prohibited business, but that some "contacts" were
regarded as essential is certain., 9 It is plain that if the Code had included stockholders with officers, agents and employees, liability for
86. Beal v. Childress, 92 Kan. lo9, 139 Pac. II98 (1914).

87. 105 Va. 439, 53 S. E. 96i (i9o5).
88. Id. at 441, 53 S. E. at 96i (i9o5) (Italics added).
89. See Goldsberry v. Carter, ioo Va. 438, 41 S. E. 858

(i9o2).
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corporate obligations would not have been imposed on a stockholder
merely because of his holding of stock. Some "contacts" between him
and the carrying on of the prohibited business would have been necessary.
The statute of North Dakota 0oimposing on officers, agents and
stockholders of a foreign corporation unlawfully doing business in the
state liability for any and all contracts made within the state by such
corporation has been enforced against officers, 9 1 but no case seems to
have arisen in which enforcement has been sought against mere stockholders. Refusal to enforce liability under a similar Colorado statute
92
has already been noted.
Statements occur from which one might conclude that the Tennessee courts impose upon stockholders of a foreign corporation failing
to domesticate in the state personal liability for obligations incurred or
performable in Tennessee on credit of the corporation.9 3 That conclusion would be inaccurate. According to a late case,
"The pertinent principle upon which individual or partnership
liability rests for obligations created in a corporate name is nonrecognition of the corporate existence whenever the obligations
sued on arise out of the doing of business in Tennessee without
domesticating here. There being no corporation to be bound,
those participating,whether stockholders, officers or other agents,
in the doing of the business which gives rise to the demand, are
held liable..
"It must be borne in mind that the prohibition of our statutes is
against the doing of business in this State without domesticating
here. It is a violation of this prohibition which results in individual liability. The corporate cloak does not protect the participating individuals from liability for these obligations which are
incurred in the doing of business in Tennessee, unless the corporation is domesticated here." 94
Thus, Tennessee holds that stockholders in a foreign corporation doing a
local business in the state without complying with the Tennessee statute
are liable for corporate obligations incurred in the course of such business only if they have "participated". And a stockholder "participates"
in Tennessee business if the corporation is chartered to exploit mineral
go. N. D. REv. CODE (19o) §§ 4695-4699.
9i. Chesley v. Soo Lignite Coal Co., ig N. D. ig, 121 N. W. 73 (i9o9), semble.
92. Leyner Engineering Works v. Kempner, 163 Fed. 6o5 (S. D. Tex. i9o8).
See pp. 467, 47o supra. Liability has been enforced under the Colorado statute against

the incorporators, agents, officers and directors of a Delaware corporation. Keeler v.
Union Trust Co., 84 Colo. 353,

270 Pac. 867 (1928).
2 BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935)

§ 179.28, and n. 2.
94. Campbell-Moss-Johnson, Inc. v. Lupton, 155 Tenn. 93, 95, 97, 290 S. W. 992,
993 (1927), petlition.for rehearing denied, I S. W. (2d) 783 (1927). (Italicization of
"participating" in second paragraph added.)
93. See
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and timber resources in Tennessee and work is done in Tennessee pursuant to that purpose. For a claim accruing as a result of work done
in the course of such development a stockholder incurs personal liability. 95 It seems that a stockholder is a "participant" in Tennessee
business also if he votes to have the foreign corporation, formed to
work coal and iron lands in Tennessee, execute a mortgage on that
land.98 Beyond this the Tennessee courts give no aid. Where stockholders have been held liable they have been spoken of as "participat97
ing", but the nature of their "participation" has not been set forth.
At this point Towle v. Beistle 98 merits discussion. In that case
the defendants were stockholders in Acme Manufacturing Company, an
Indiana corporation organized to do business in Indiana. It had engaged in business in Tennessee without observance of the Tennessee
statute.9 9 The corporate activities had been so extended to Tennessee
without the "affirmative assistance, consent, or participation" of the
defendants. The plaintiff sought to hold them liable on trade acceptances given and payable in Tennessee and arising from transactions
entered into in behalf of the corporation in that state. The Appellate
Court of Indiana affirmed judgment for the defendants, saying:
"The mere fact alone of ownership of the common capital stock
by the appellees . . . is not sufficient to hold the appellees responsible for the obligations of the company .
"This brings us to a consideration of the question as to whether
or not the amended complaint contains sufficient allegations to show
a liability of the appellees for the obligations sued upon on the
theory that they are participatingstockholders in the transaction of
the business of the offending corporation. Under the decisions if
they are participating stockholders, they will be deemed to have
consented to be bound. In the case before us there are no affirmatie acts of participationalleged to have been done by the appellees.
. . . To participate in the sense necessary to bind the appellees
herein it was necessary for them to do an affirmative act, to take
part, to consent either affirmatively or in contemplation of law to
be bound." 100
The Appellate Court refused to indulge in dicta as to what acts or
failures to act might constitute "participation". 10 1
95. Cunnyngham v. Shelby, 136 Tenn. 176, 188 S. W. 1147 (1916).
96. See Equitable Trust Co. v. Central Trust Co., 145 Tenn. 148, 175, 239 S. W.
171, 181 (1921).

97. Neither of the Tennessee cases cited in notes 95 and 96 supra discuss at length
the matter of "participation". Cf. London Guaranty & Accident Co. v. Signal Mountain Coal Mining Co., 15 Tenn. App. 124 (1932).
98. 97 Ind. App. 241, 186 N. E. 344 (1933).
99. Tenn. Laws i8gi, c. 122, §§ 1-4, as amended by Tenn. Laws 1895, c. 81, §§ 1-3.
100. 97 Ind. App. 241, 247-249, 186 N. E. 344, 346 (1933)

(Italics added).

ioi. Ibid. One would infer that the Indiana court felt that it was deciding the
case before it as a Tennessee court would have done.
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Suppose, however, that the Indiana court had found that under a
Tennessee statute as construed by the Tennessee courts mere ownership
of stock in the Acme Manufacturing Company under the circumstances
of the case sufficed to make the owners liable for the corporate debts
contracted in Tennessee. Such construction of the Tennessee statute
might not have violated due process, had the corporation been formed
in Indiana for the express purpose of engaging in an intrastate business
in Tennessee. 10 2 Nor would enforcement of the statute in Tennessee
courts against stockholders, who had either subjected their persons to
the jurisdiction of the Tennessee courts or had been residents of
Tennessee at the time the corporate obligations were incurred, 10 3 have
offended the Fourteenth Amendment. Perhaps under these conditions
the full faith and credit clause would require Indiana to allow suit in
its courts to enforce the obligations arising under the Tennessee
04

statute.'

The Arkansas court has also refused to impose liability upon stockholders of a Delaware corporation for debts of the corporation contracted in Tennessee while the corporation was doing business in the
latter state without complying with the Tennessee statute. 10 5 The court
may have had a feeling that the liability which it assumed would have
been imposed in Tennessee was "penal". However, the court did say
that if a Tennessee statute had imposed the liability, it might have held
that the stockholders were under a "contractual" liability enforceable in
Arkansas. Perhaps the court felt that the full faith and credit clause
would compel it to allow the enforcement of a liability arising under
a Tennessee statute expressly making the stockholders liable for debts
incurred in Tennessee by a foreign corporation doing business there
without a license.
Going back to the assumption that under a Tennessee statute as
construed by the courts of that state mere ownership of stock in the
Acme Manufacturing Company sufficed to make the holders of the stock
liable for corporate obligations contracted in Tennessee, the duty of
Indiana to give full faith and credit to the statute would seem to turn
on whether or not the doing of intrastate business in Tennessee sufficed
to give that state sufficient "contact". Whether or not the application of
the Tennessee statute by Tennessee to non-resident stockholders would
in circumstances like those in Towle v. Beistle offend the due process
clause would seem to turn also on that question.
lO2. See Thomas v. Matthiessen, 232 U. S. 221 (1913). See pp. 457, 463 supra.
lO3. This seems a warrantable conclusion from Pinney v. Nelson, 183 U. S. 144
(igoi). See pp. 465, 470 supra.
lO4. Thomas v. Matthiessen, 232 U. S. 221 (1913), semble. See pp. 457, 463 supra.
1O5. American Trust Co. v. Vandertuuk, 175 Ark. 728, I S. W. (2d) 41 (1927).
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The conclusion has already been reached 106 that a state does not
have jurisdiction under the Constitution to impose upon a non-resident
stockholder in a foreign corporation personal liability for a debt of the
corporation merely because the debt was incurred within the state in the
course of local business. Something more is needed. The "something
more"-the additional "contact"-may be citizenship or residence of
the stockholder in the state. The requirement for the "something
more" may be satisfied if the corporation was formed for the express
purpose (set forth in the charter or articles of association) of doing
business in the state which seeks to impose the individual, personal
liability. Or the requirement may be satisfied if proof be made that the
stockholder at the time he acquired his stock knew or had reason to
know that the corporation was doing or would do a local business in
that state. In no case was there any question of the propriety of the
doing of the local business by the foreign corporation save in Leyner
Engineering Works v. Kempner,10 7 and there no liability was held to
fall upon the stockholder. If the power of a state to impose personal
liability upon a stockholder in a foreign corporation licensed to do
business within the state is limited in the manner indicated, must not
the state be as narrowly limited in jurisdiction to impose individual liability for debts incurred in the name and on behalf of a foreign corporation in the course of a local business for the doing of which the
corporation has not been licensed? How can the failure of the corporation to secure a license implement the jurisdiction of the state over
a non-resident stockholder who has not participated in the doing of the
local business? It is hard to see how this question can receive other
than a negative answer.' 0 8
To recapitulate, the jurisdiction of a state to impose a liability
upon a stockholder in a foreign corporation licensed to do a local business in the state is closely parallel to its jurisdiction to impose liability
upon a stockholder in a foreign corporation doing a local business
without a license. The stockholder liability seems limited to obligations
incurred in the course of the local business within the state. In both
situations the doing of the local business has not been regarded as
sufficient to give the state jurisdiction to impose personal liability upon
the non-resident stockholder. He must somehow "participate" by giving his personal assent to the conduct of the local business or by taking
part therein as a "worker" of some sort. It may be that the power of
lo6. See p. 471 supra.

107. 163 Fed. 605 (S. D. Tex. i9o8). See pp. 467, 470 supra.
lo8. Cases dealing with tort liability are rare. When liability in tort has been
imposed on a stockholder in an unlicensed foreign corporation, he has "participated"
in the local business in the course of which the injury was caused to the plaintiff.
Mandeville v. Courtright, 142 Fed. 97 (C. C. A. 3d, 195o). See also Rowden v. Daniell,
I51Mo. App. I5, 132 S. E. 23 (91o).
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the state over a resident shareholder is greater than over a non-resident.
In short, although the point has been raised in only one case,' 0 9 the
cases are in actual decision (whatever the professed reasoning) consistent with the theory that a state other than that of incorporation is
under a duty to give full faith and credit to the immunity from personal
liability granted a stockholder by the statute of the state of incorporation, unless some interest is shown in imposing personal liability that is
superior to the interest of the state of incorporation in granting immunity from such liability. Granting that such a duty exists, the conclusion will be that the power of a state to "exclude" a foreign corporation
from a local business turns on whether the state can show that some
proper interest of its own is served by such "exclusion". It is difficult
for a state to show such an interest when it extends the privilege of
doing the same kind of a local business to corporations of its own
creation, without limitation to number, which are formed subject to
requirements similar to those to which the foreign corporation is subject
under the law of the state of its creation.
V. EXCLUSION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
None of the cases considered in the preceding section involved a
state of facts in which a state had sought to exclude foreign corporations entirely from local business and to give a monopoly thereof to
domestic corporations. The cases dealt with situations in which a
foreign corporation could have qualified to transact a local business, but
failed to comply with a statute. Nevertheless local business was done
in its name and on its behalf. The conclusion was reached that failure
to comply with the statute did not prevent the state from imposing
liability upon the corporation for obligations incurred in the course of
local business. As to such the corporation was subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state. But the state, it was seen, did not have
jurisdiction to impose liability upon mere stockholders as such.
The jurisdiction of the state would be no broader were there a
statute to exclude foreign corporations entirely from local business. If
in violation of such a statute a foreign corporation through agents were
to transact local business, no doubt the corporation could be held liable
in the courts of the state on causes of action arising out of the business
it had been forbidden to transact. The state might refuse all legal
effect to bargains made in the course of such business and deny any
right of action thereon to persons bargaining with the corporation.
The disposition, however, is to permit the enforcement against an
unlicensed foreign corporation of bargains made by it in the course of
lO9. Leyner Engineering Works v. Kempner, 163 Fed. 6o5 (S. D. Tex. 19o8).
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the prohibited business.1 10 The state might enjoin individuals from
acting as agents within the state in behalf of the foreign corporation or
might institute proceedings in the nature of quo warranto against the
foreign corporation. Persons enjoined from acting as agents might,
nevertheless, disobey the injunction and the foreign corporation might
disregard a decree of ouster. Liabilities on obligations incurred in local
business transacted in disregard of such judicial decrees would be no
more extensive than before. The statute itself is an injunction in general terms and a decree against certain specified persons or in proceedings in the nature of quo warranto could hardly enlarge the jurisdiction
of the state over persons outside.
What is the reality back of the principle that the state may impose
liability upon the foreign corporation doing business in the state in
violation of statute? The state does not have jurisdiction to impose
liability for obligations incurred in the course of such business upon
stockholders in the corporation as individuals merely because they are
stockholders. It does have jurisdiction to impose liability upon them
in their corporate capacity-in accord with the law of incorporation.
But in the absence of special contacts between it and stockholders as
individuals it cannot impose liability upon the latter in violation of the
law of incorporation. To that extent a state is under a duty to give full
faith and credit to a foreign corporation law or to a charter secured
under such a statute.
In practice a foreign corporation is not going to persist in doing a
local business if the state is constantly making life unpleasant for persons acting in the corporation's behalf. Somehow the corporation will
challenge the validity of the statute that purports to authorize state
officers to make life troublesome for its agents or employees. In certain
cases the courts will feel that the state is justified in taking steps that
will induce investors in a business enterprise to secure local incorporation. In Railway Express Agency v. Virginia,"" for example, if we
could imagine the Express Company as carrying on an intrastate business in disregard of the decision, the agents acting in the state for the
corporation could be fined or imprisoned. But mere non-resident stockholders, taking no part in the Virginia business, could not be charged
with personal liability for debts incurred in Virginia. Only in their
corporate capacity-only in accord with the law of their incorporationcould liability be imposed upon them by Virginia for claims arising in
the course of the Virginia business. Thus even when it is said that a
corporation can be "excluded" from a state, one should remember that
11o. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT oF LAWS (1934)
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the state is not at liberty to disregard the law of incorporation completely. In imposing liability upon the stockholders the state has to
follow the rule of limited liability laid down by that law unless some
additional "contact" between it and the particular stockholder is established. The state will have to implement its policy of not allowing
foreign corporations to transact domestic business of intrastate character by some other means.
The theory of the power of a state to "exclude" foreign corporations was formulated at a period prior to widespread recognition in this
country of the corporate device as a useful and desirable form of
associated enterprise-at a time when the desire to restrict the powers
of corporations outside of the state of incorporation was strong. The
history of the American law of corporations during the past century
has been described as one of "judicial groping for a reconciliation
between the practical position achieved by the corporation in society and
a natural desire to confine the powers of these artificial creatures." 112
That attempt at harmonizing has attained a large degree of success. 11 3
The time has come to abjure lip service to the theory of the power to
"exclude" and to recognize that a state does have to give full faith
and credit to such parts of the corporation law of a sister state as regulate the legal relations to third persons of members of a corporation
organized under that law and that only when the state shows a sufficiently strong governmental interest will it be allowed to take such
steps against individuals as will effectively dissuade them from acting
within its territory in behalf of the foreign corporation.
112. Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U. S. 165, i69 (i39).
113. Id. at i69 et seq.

